Is the Stability and Growth Pact anti-growth?

 

by Giorgos Karanasios* and André Azevedo Alves**

 

 

The euro area's Stability and Growth Pact has been under growing pressure from both European politicians and opinion-makers who maintain that the limitations imposed on budget deficits make it impossible for governments to pursue so called "expansionist" fiscal policies that would allegedly be appropriate for the current economic downturn.

 

As the pressure increases and several euro area governments (including the influential French and German executives) lobby more or less explicitly for a "relaxation" of the commitments to limit and progressively reduce budget deficits, it is now more relevant than ever to understand the rationale behind the constraints currently imposed by the Pact.

 

The Stability and Growth Pact sets a limit of three percent of GDP to deficits and also demands that euro area governments bring their budgets into balance in the medium turn.

 

As stupid as it may seem to some high level EU officials, the fact is that strict, precise and rigorous limitations on deficits are one of the essential conditions that must be satisfied in order for the euro to be a stable and credible currency. In the current monetary system, recurring budget deficits would indicate to the financial markets that the euro has significant depreciation and inflationary risks. The perception of those risks would have adverse effects on investment, therefore damaging the prospects for economic growth and job creation in the euro area.

 

The limitation of deficits, combined with continuing fiscal competition between the several member states' tax systems, is one of the few existing safeguards against excessive government spending and the crowding out of private investment in the euro area.

 

The proposals for discretionary fiscal loosening will result, if implemented, in more governmental bond issuances. Given the fact that the borrowed money will be mainly spent on wage and pension increases (therefore boosting consumption), and on public works, that typically have declining returns and a significant level of waste, it is highly unlikely that any real and lasting growth could ever result from such a process. Instead, savings will be eroded and a new vicious cycle of inflation and growing public debt will be set in motion, once again repeating what happened in the recent past. A sad and heavy legacy will be left for future generations that will be forced to bear the burden of more taxes, either directly or through monetary depreciation. Only limited deficits can limit the growth of public debt and are in line with the general common sense equation that governments (and people) cannot live beyond their means.

     

Further relaxation of the deficit ceiling would strongly undermine the ECB’s monetary policy and is in conflict with its main anti-inflation policy goal. An increased supply of government bonds generates upward pressure on interest rates and boosts inflationary prospects. Thus, monetary stability would be endangered and that would disrupt the credibility and reliability of the Euro exchange rates and the quality of the long term economic calculation essential for productive investment.

 

Insisting on sizeable spending programs ignores the other policy alternatives and is a convenient way to avoid serious and much needed reforms. It also means a lack of trust on the entrepreneurial and spontaneous order of free markets and a return to state interventionism. Furthermore, who can ensure that expansionary fiscal policies will not be abused, mainly in pre-electoral periods? No one can exclude the existence of hidden motives on the part of EU’s government agents, mainly those who are the most vocal in their criticisms of the existing Pact. Those in greater need of maintaining their political power through paternalistic behavior towards their voters and through the distribution of benefits to special interest groups would naturally not mind loosening and breaking the rules. That is obviously the case both in France and in Germany, ironically, the country-architect of the Stability Pact. The possibility of discretionary spending for political reasons, mainly in pre-electoral periods, can only be limited by sticking to the consistent pursuit of limited deficits.   

 

If there is further relaxation of the limitations on deficit spending or if exceptions are allowed for some member states, all euro area governments will be increasingly pressured by interest groups in their countries to also increase deficit spending, therefore generating a vicious circle, which would undermine both the euro and the prospects for economic growth.

 

The fundamental point is that eliminating deficit spending is a pro-growth economic policy and would be desirable even if the Stability and Growth Pact did not require it. In order to tackle the current economic downturn there are plenty of things that governments can do instead of being obsessed with the destruction of the Stability and Growth Pact.

 

If euro area governments are truly interested in stimulating growth and employment they should greatly reduce public spending, cut taxes, allow greater flexibility in labor markets, drastically reduce bureaucracy and liberalize over regulated markets. Increased public spending and budget deficits are part of the problem, not of the solution.

 

 

April 2003

 

* Giorgos Karanasios – Greek Libertynet for the promotion of Classical Liberalism

** André Azevedo Alves – Causa Liberal - Portuguese association for the study and debate of Classical Liberalism

 

Causa Liberal